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RCRA Citizen Suits and State Courts:
Jurisdictional Trap After
Davis v. Sun Oil Company'
A. MARK SEGRETI, JR.2
Introduction
The common occurrence of a leaking underground storage
tank and the resulting contamination of soil and groundwater can
lead to the navigation of the not so pristine waters of jurisdiction
and federalism when a plaintiff seeks to enforce both common law
and citizen enforcement rights under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA).3 It is not unusual to first discover the
problem when the owner of real estate is trying to sell the prop-
erty and the prospective purchaser's due diligence leads to the dis-
covery of the contamination from a prior owner. The owner is
faced with losing a valuable sale of the property unless counsel
can find a way to remedy the contamination.
This article discusses the remedies available and the problem
of splitting the cause of action between state and federal courts, a
procedural issue addressed for the first time by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Davis v. Sun Oil Com-
pany.4 The issue in Davis was whether there was concurrent fed-
eral and state court jurisdiction over RCRA citizen suits to abate
environmental hazards. 5 The plaintiff in Davis III lost the claim
under RCRA because the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
became the first circuit court to hold that a RCRA citizen suit
1. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998).
2. Member, Ohio Bar. J.D. (cum laude), The Ohio State University College of
Law; practices environmental law and litigation at Haffey & Segreti, Dayton, Ohio.
The author was counsel for Davis, the plaintiff, in the litigation discussed herein.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1995).
4. Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Davis II1], affg
953 F. Supp. 890 (S.D. Ohio 1996) [hereinafter Davis III, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1018
(1998).
5. Section 6972(a)(2) of RCRA provides for an abatement action and states: "Any
action brought under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought in the dis-
trict court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endan-
germent may occur." Id.
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could be brought in state court and the state court judgment
barred the federal claim.6
I. The Factual Setting of Petroleum Contamination
In Davis, the owners discovered gasoline contamination on
the property they had purchased from Sun Oil Company, which
had previously operated a Sunoco gasoline station on the prop-
erty.7 Although the tanks had been removed by Sun prior to the
sale, the connecting pipes had been left in the ground.8 Four
years after the purchase, Davis attempted to sell the valuable cor-
ner property to United Dairy Farmers for the operation of a mini-
mart and gasoline station.9 The contract was conditioned on the
property being environmentally clean. 10 The prospective pur-
chaser performed Phase I and Phase III' environmental assess-
ments and discovered the gasoline contamination. 12 Davis
notified Sun Oil and the Bureau of Underground Storage Tank
Regulations (BUSTR)13 of the contamination.' 4 Sun Oil then
agreed to enter the property and remedy the contamination it had
caused. It entered, but did not completely remedy the contamina-
tion, leaving contaminated soil and groundwater.' 5 As a result,
the contract for the sale of the property was lost.16
The soil and groundwater testing, conducted before and after
Sun entered with its consultants, found high levels of benzene, tol-
uene, ethylbenzene and xylenes, collectively known as BTEX.' 7
Sun refused to complete the cleanup and filled in its excavation of
one former tank cavity.' 8
6. 148 F.3d at 612.
7. See Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio App. 1996).
8. Id. at 1053.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. As part of "due diligence" in purchasing real estate, the purchaser performs
an environmental assessment. A "Phase I" assessment is a review of public records
concerning the property. A "Phase II" assessment is more intrusive, and involves bor-
ings into the soil, sampling, and laboratory analysis.
12. Davis, 671 N.E.2d at 1053.
13. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3737.87 (West 2001).
14. Davis, 671 N.E.2d at 1053.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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II. Legal Avenues Available for the Present Owners
In 1984, Congress amended RCRA in response to a growing
national problem of soil and groundwater contamination from
sources such as underground storage tanks and pipelines. 19 Part
of RCRA dealt specifically with such tank systems and addressed
the repair and replacement of them.20 Many neighborhood service
stations of the 1950s and 1960s stored gasoline underground to
avoid the potential fire and explosion hazards associated with a
surface tank. 21 Most tanks were made of steel and not particu-
larly designed to prevent corrosion and deterioration. 22 As a re-
sult, the subsequent deterioration led to gasoline leakage.
Leaking tanks can cause soil contamination in the area just
under the ground surface, and contamination of nearby ground-
water.23 Gasoline is also known to migrate, with the ground-
water, off the property to other locations. 24 It can be a threat to
drinking water, as well as a substantial risk to property and per-
sons who come in contact with it. In the Davis case, the owner
knew the problem was caused by the former owner's service sta-
tion, but sometimes finding the culprit is not so easy.
The common law causes of action in nuisance and trespass
often fit the bill for environmental harm. Many courts apply these
torts only when there is an interference with the use of property or
damage to property by a nearby landowner or someone else.25 Al-
though some states, like Ohio, have statutory nuisances, they usu-
ally do not apply.26 Ohio also defines a common law nuisance as a
"civil wrong arising or resulting from the invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest."27
19. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 98-1133, at 79, 128, (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5699. See also R. L. Meehan, A Natural History of Underground
Fuel Tank Leakage, 5 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 339 (1993).
20. Title VI of the Solid Waste Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 601, 99 Stat.
3221 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6991).
21. OFFICE OF UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS, U.S. EPA, PROPOSED REGULATIONS
FOR UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS (1987).
22. Id.
23. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-1133, at 128, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5699.
24. See Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). Much of the reasoning
is based on the limitations on vendor liability inherent in the common law doctrine of
caveat emptor, precluding a nuisance claim. See Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 780
F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (S.D. Miss. 1991), aff'd, 989 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied
sub nom. Cooper v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 510 U.S. 117 (1994).
26. Many state nuisance statutes deal with "lewdness," prostitution, and the like.
27. Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 55 N.E.2d 724, 725 (Ohio 1944).
20011
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In other jurisdictions, the application of private nuisance to a
prior owner is unclear. Private nuisance is defined in section
821(D) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as "a nontrespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land."28 In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,29 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that pri-
vate nuisance was not designed to permit "a purchaser of real
property to recover from the seller ... for conditions existing on
the very land transferred. '" 30 The court concluded that nuisance
liability requires a "finding that [defendant's] conduct violates a
protected interest of the neighbor-plaintiff."31 Actually, the court
was invoking the doctrine of caveat emptor as an impediment to a
suit against the prior owner.32 Sections 351 and 352 of the Re-
statement describe the rule that appears to preclude liability of a
vendor for leaking underground tank systems.33 The nuisance
cause of action did not contemplate a vendee suing a land vendor
for the vendor's past conduct on the land.34 The Ohio nuisance
law does not make this distinction. The civil wrong is the unlaw-
ful release of petroleum from a tank. Also, the failure to cleanup
the contamination is a civil wrong under statutory law.35 Never-
theless, courts may adopt the Hercules rationale and decline to
apply nuisance law against the real estate vendor.36
Usually the length of time between the purchase of the prop-
erty and the discovery of the contamination prevents use of the
equitable doctrine of rescission to recover the purchase price from
the vendor. In Davis, the value of the property had increased sub-
stantially since its purchase from the gasoline company,37 and re-
scission was not a solution. The Rylands v. Fletcher38 type strict
liability claims for "abnormally dangerous" activity most likely do
not apply because the gasoline is underground and not an explo-
sion risk in most cases. The six factors listed in the Restatement
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D.
29. 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985).
30. Id. at 313.
31. Id. at 314 n.9, (quoting 5 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 704, at 320).
32. See id. at 312-14.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 351, 352 (1965).
34. Philadelphia Electric Co., 762 F.2d at 315.
35. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3737.89(A) (West 2001).
36. The state court in Davis dismissed the nuisance law claim. See Davis v. Sun
Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d 1049, 1054 (Ohio App. 1996).
37. See id. at 1052-53.
38. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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for determining abnormally dangerous activity appear not to
apply.39
The state statutes implementing RCRA regulate the storage
tanks, but most often do not provide for a private cause of action;
thus, there probably is no state statutory claim for relief. The
state regulatory agencies often require a site assessment and or-
der the responsible party to perform it to determine the extent of
the contamination. After approval of the studies, the responsible
party must prepare a remedial action plan to perform the cleanup;
however, these statutes typically provide enforcement only by the
agency and do not set forth a private cause of action.40 RCRA,
however, does contain a citizen suit provision. 41 A citizen can file
suit against the person or entity contributing to the contamination
if it poses (or may pose) "an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment."42 The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has held that the provision does not allow
the recovery of damages. 43 Thus, the citizen suit provision is only
available for injunctive relief, the assessment of civil penalties to
be paid to the government, and other appropriate relief.44
Another possible route for liability is common law fraud. In
Davis, the plaintiffs alleged that Sun committed fraud when it
told Davis that the tanks were removed, but left the piping that
connected the tanks to the service station islands. 45 Federal law
defines the underground storage system to include the connecting
pipes. 46 By the time the plaintiffs inspected the excavation, Sun
had filled it in and covered it over.47 The fraud claim was based
on fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation. 48 The repre-
sentation that the tanks had been removed and the fact that the
excavation was then promptly covered, were sufficient to support
the trial court finding of fraud.49 Had there been no representa-
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976).
40. Davis, 671 N.E.2d at 1053.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1995).
42. Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
43. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)
44. The federal district court agreed that civil penalties were available in a citizen
suit, but payable to the government. See Davis 11, 953 F. Supp. 890, 893 n.5 (S.D.
Ohio 1996). The trial judge did not note that the daily civil penalties would be an
incentive to cleanup the property.
45. Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 929 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D. Ohio 1996) [hereinafter Davis I].
46. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (1995).
47. See Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio App. 1996).
48. Id. at 1051.
49. Id. at 1058.
2001]
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tion of fact, the claim for fraud would not have been available. In
asserting a fraudulent concealment claim, a plaintiff may argue
that the vendor concealed an artificial condition on the property
that has resulted in physical harm, however, such a claim is usu-
ally limited to personal injuries.50
III. Legal Action Taken in Davis v. Sun Against the Prior
Owner
A. State Court Action
In Davis, the prospective purchaser sent a copy of its Phase II
sampling report to BUSTR, the state agency that regulated under-
ground storage tanks. 51 BUSTR ordered Sun to perform a site as-
sessment.5 2 Under the Ohio statute, the responsible person is the
"person who is the owner or operator of an underground storage
tank system."53 Since the tanks were operated prior to the adop-
tion of the state regulations, the statute defines the responsible
person as the last owner prior to "discontinuation of its use."54
Nevertheless, there was no private claim in the statute for
Davis. They filed suit against Sun in state court, first stating that
Sun had acted contrary to unspecified state and federal laws in
not cleaning up the property, and requested relief.55 Faced with
the threat of dismissal, Davis later amended the complaint to as-
sert that Sun was guilty of common law fraud, private nuisance,
and breach of the letter contract.56 The letter allowing Sun access
to the site had included the promise that it would remedy the con-
tamination on the site. 57
Sun moved for summary judgment arguing that the letter
was not a contract and that a common law nuisance action could
not lie in favor of a vendee of real estate against the vendor.58 The
trial court held that the letter was a contract, 59 but dismissed the
common law nuisance claim.60 The court essentially adopted the
Hercules approach and limited the private nuisance action to con-
50. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 353 (1977).
51. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1053.
52. Id.
53. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3737.87(N) (West 2001).
54. Id. § 3737.87(H).
55. Davis III, 148 F.3d 606, 608 (6th Cir. 1998).
56. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1049.
57. Id. at 1050.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
[Vol. 19
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duct by someone other than a prior owner of the same property. 61
In the meantime, Sun had not performed the site assessment and
the state agency again ordered it to do so.62 Davis amended the
complaint again to request that the court grant specific perform-
ance of the letter contract and order the cleanup. 63
B. Federal Court Action under RCRA
In the meantime, Davis was concerned that they may have
rights under RCRA, and did not want to forfeit those rights. Da-
vis sent notice to Sun and the governmental agencies, as required
by 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). 64 Thereafter, they filed their citizen suit
in the federal district court for the district in which the alleged
imminent and substantial endangerment had occurred. 65
The federal district court and the parties agreed to stay the
federal action pending resolution of the state court action. 66 The
parties sought to avoid duplication and thought the state court
action could moot the dispute or at least limit the issues in the
federal court case. Sun had asserted the defense of resjudicata in
its answer, but did not object to the stay or the demand that the
federal claim be included in the state court action.67 In addition,
Sun did not demand that the federal district court dismiss the
RCRA action.
C. State Court Judgment
After several days in state court, the magistrate recom-
mended, and the trial court agreed, that Sun committed fraudu-
lent concealment when it did not remove the entire underground
storage tank system and left the gasoline lines in the ground that
had connected the tanks to the pump stations. 68 The lines were
concealed when Sun covered the excavations prior to the
purchase. 69 The court awarded Davis damages equal to the
amount that they had spent attempting to cleanup the gasoline
61. Id.
62. Davis III, 148 F.3d at 608.
63. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1054.
64. See Davis I, 929 F. Supp. 1077, 1078 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
65. Id.
66. Davis III, 148 F.3d at 608.
67. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 613-615 (Boggs, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
68. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1054.
69. Id. at 1053.
2001]
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contamination themselves, 70 and punitive damages in the amount
equal to attorneys' fees and consultant fees paid up until the time
of trial. 71 The court also granted specific performance of the letter
contract, ordering Sun to complete the cleanup within one year
and to post a $400,000 performance bond to assure completion of
the cleanup in a timely manner. 72
The state court denied Davis' request for damages due to the
lost sale of the property. 73 The court reasoned that because the
contract gave the buyer the option to terminate, and the property
was still marketable if cleaned up, the sale was not lost.74 The
court, however, did not address the claim of fraud for Sun's con-
cealment of the gasoline contamination it found when, after being
granted access to the property, it excavated one tank cavity, found
contamination in the walls of the cavity, stopped work, and then
back filled the cavity and left. 75
The trial court's judgment included a factual finding that the
benzene contamination greatly exceeded state requirements. 76
Petroleum hydrocarbons were also found to exceed state limita-
tions. 77 The parties informed the federal district court judge in
the RCRA action of the state court judgment, but continued the
stay of proceedings, pending an appeal by Sun.78 Sun did not in-
sist that the RCRA action be dismissed. Nor did they assert res
judicata or splitting of the cause of action.
D. State Court Appeals
Sun appealed the trial court judgment to the state court of
appeals and did not perform according to the order of the trial
court. 79 Sun requested a stay, but since it never posted a bond, a
stay was never granted. On appeal, Sun argued that BUSTR had
exclusive jurisdiction over underground storage tanks and that
the state trial court had no jurisdiction to order a cleanup.8 0 In
effect, Sun argued that by having a state regulatory agency, com-
70. Davis III, 148 F.3d at 608.
71. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1054.
72. Id. at 1055.
73. Id. at 1060-61.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1049.
76. Id. at 1050.
77. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1050.
78. Davis III, 148 F.3d at 608.
79. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1054.
80. Id.
[Vol. 19
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mon law claims were preempted.8 ' Davis argued that common
law actions were not preempted by state laws and state law did
not prevent the trial court from enforcing contracts and awarding
damages for fraud. Davis pointed out that the trial court had or-
dered Sun to clean up according to BUSTR standards, and there-
fore, there was no conflict.8 2
The state court of appeals affirmed the trial court in almost
all respects, except it found that the trial judge's one-year dead-
line for completion of the cleanup had the potential to conflict with
the existing state regulations for a cleanup of leaking under-
ground storage tanks.8 3 No state agency regulation set a timeta-
ble for cleanups. The regulations, however, set forth the step by
step process, which requires agency approval of site assessment,
determination of the extent of contamination, preparation of a re-
medial action plan, performance of the work, and closing of the
site.8 4 The Ohio Court of Appeals, even without an actual conflict,
eliminated the one-year deadline.8 5 It modified the trial court or-
der to require that the cleanup be done expeditiously, in accor-
dance with the regulations of the state agency.8 6 The decision was
a major victory for Sun and left the enforceability of the specific
performance order in question.8 7
After the appeal, Sun filed the performance bond that was al-
ready a year late. The trial court had not acted on Davis' motion
for contempt that was pending during the appeal. Sun paid the
damage portion of the trial court judgment and five months later
prepared another site assessment for submittal to BUSTR. Sun
still had not determined the extent of contamination at the site,
which was essential for BUSTR approval of the remedial action
plan.
E. RCRA Summary Judgment in Federal Court
(1) Plaintiffs Motion for Collateral Estoppel
The federal court judge was informed of the state court judg-
ment.88 The immediate inquiry was whether the federal action
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1055.
84. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:7-9-13 (Anderson 2001).
85. See Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d at 1055.
86. Id. at 1061.
87. See id.
88. Davis I, 929 F. Supp. 1077, 1078 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
20011
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would be dismissed and if any additional forms of relief were
available.8 9 The plaintiffs were concerned because Sun had not
started work on the cleanup. Thus, they requested that the fed-
eral district court, based on the state trial court's factual finding of
high levels of benzene, grant summary judgment as to liability for
contamination that "may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment."90 Davis requested
that the court find in his favor on a collateral estoppel theory
against Sun, even though the precise issue was not before the
state court.91 Davis argued that the logical effect of the state
court's finding was that the contamination "may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment." 92
Davis relied on case law that interpreted the citizen suit pro-
vision of RCRA as not to require an actual endangerment to
health or the environment, but that such a threat may be present.
Section 6972(a)(1)(B) uses the language "may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment." 93 Endangerment itself
means a "threatened or potential harm and does not require proof
of actual harm."94 Federal courts have accepted this interpreta-
tion.95 Nevertheless, the federal district court denied the motion
and simply found that the precise issue had not been decided by
the state court.96 Both parties had offered affidavits of experts.
Davis' chemical engineer relied on the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and other guidance documents when he stated that
the listed quantities of benzene certainly present the potential for
imminent and substantial harm. 97 Sun's expert stated that the
amounts were not, in fact, an imminent and substantial harm to
health or the environment. 98 It was the plaintiffs position that
they only had to show the actual threat of imminent and substan-
tial endangerment, not an actual imminent and substantial en-
dangerment. 99 The district court appeared not to recognize the
difference and merely stated that the experts were in conflict. 100
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. at 1080.
92. Id. (emphasis omitted).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2001) (emphasis added).
94. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355-56 (2d Cir. 1991).
95. See id.
96. See Davis I, 929 F. Supp. at 1077, 1082.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1081; see also Davis III, 148 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1998)
100. See Davis 1, 929 F. Supp. at 1032
[Vol. 19
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The critical point in the plaintiffs motion, that the statute did not
require actual harm but only an actual threat of harm, was over-
looked, or at least not discussed. The district judge stated that he
needed details as to the extent of the contamination before he
could grant summary judgment on the "imminent and substantial
endangerment" issue.101 The case was set for trial.
(2) Sun's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
Sun then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and ar-
gued that the case should be dismissed because the state agency
had exclusive jurisdiction and Davis already had all the relief he
could obtain. 10 2 Sun also argued that BUSTR had primary juris-
diction, which precluded the RCRA citizen suit.103 Sun did not
argue that the state court had jurisdiction over the RCRA claim or
that Davis should have included it in the state court action. 10 4
Rather, Sun argued that the state court had granted Davis com-
plete relief and, therefore, the state court judgment precluded the
RCRA action.10 5 Sun also argued that the doctrine of primary ju-
risdiction favored deferring to the state agency and not deciding
the RCRA citizen suit. 0 6 Sun further argued against any award
of restitution damages and against the availability of civil penal-
ties in a civil citizen suit under RCRA.' 0 7
The trial court judge, just before trial, issued a decision and
granted summary judgment for Sun, but not on the grounds Sun
had argued.' 08 Ironically, in light of Davis' prior attempt to use
collateral estoppel offensively against Sun, the district court found
that the federal RCRA citizen suit was barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. 0 9 On the other points, it specifically found that the
citizen suit allowed for civil penalties, but not restitution dam-
ages, which Davis had not requested." 0 The district court did not
101. Id.
102. Davis H, 953 F. Supp. at 892-94.
103. See id. at 896 n.7.
104. See id. at 892-94.
105. See id. at 893.
106. See id. at 896, n.7.
107. See Davis H, 953 F. Supp. 890, 892 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
108. See id. at 892, 894, 896.
109. Id. at 896.
110. See id. at 892. The United States Supreme Court had just decided that resti-
tution was not available in a RCRA citizen suit. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,
516 U.S. 479 (1996). The district court in Davis II found that the civil penalties provi-
sions of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) and (g) were made applicable to citizen suits in 42
2001]
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see the coercive effect of such penalties and commented that they
would be payable to the government, not Davis."'
The district court dismissed the major issue because it deter-
mined that Davis could have brought the RCRA citizen suit in
state court with the common law claims. 112 It reasoned that the
state courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal district
courts over such claims. As indicated, Sun had not made this ar-
gument. It had argued res judicata because Davis already was
given full relief. It was understood that all claims should be liti-
gated in one action where possible. However, it was generally ac-
cepted that there was exclusive federal court jurisdiction over the
RCRA citizen suit.113 The district court decision was new law and
contrary to the holding by a district court in New Jersey that had
addressed the issue twelve years earlier." 4 The district court had
not given the parties the opportunity to brief this precise issue." 5
In fact, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals flatly stated in
Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs" 6 that "RCRA places exclu-
sive jurisdiction in federal courts for suits brought pursuant to
section 6972(a)(1)." The Eighth Circuit holding in Blue Legs was
recognized as good law in Fletcher v. United States;" 7 Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Farley;"" (decided after the district court ruling in Davis);
and Reservation Telephone Cooperative v. Three Affiliated Tribes
of the Fort Berthold Reservation."9 In addition, other courts have
recognized exclusive federal court jurisdiction. For instance, the
court in White & Brewer Trucking, Inc. v. Donley, 20 held that
Burford abstention was inappropriate when the federal action in
which abstention was sought contained RCRA claims over which
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. 12
The 1986 federal court decision in Middlesex County held
there was exclusive federal court jurisdiction, interpreting the
U.S.C. § 6972(a). Davis 11, 953 F. Supp. at 892 (citing Clorox v. Chromium Corp., 158
F.R.D. 120, 128 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992)).
111. See Davis I, 953 F. Supp. at 893 n.5.
112. Id. at 896.
113. Id. at 894.
114. See Middlesex County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F. Supp.
715, 719 (D.N.J. 1986).
115. See id. at 715.
116. 867 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1988).
117. 116 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 1997).
118. 115 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1997).
119. 76 F.3d 181, 185-86 (8th Cir. 1996).
120. 952 F. Supp. 1306 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
121. See id. at 1312.
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word "shall" in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) as mandatory to the court
where the action must be brought.122 It also relied on language in
the legislative history of RCRA as an indication of congressional
intent that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. 123 The
primary congressional committee supporting the bill reported
that:
Although the Committee has not prohibited a citizen from rais-
ing claims under state law in a [Section 6972] action, the Com-
mittee expects courts to exercise their discretion concerning
pendent jurisdiction in a way that will not frustrate or delay
prompt abatement of imminent and substantial endanger-
ments.124
It is presumed that Congress is familiar with the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. 25 Under established judicial
doctrine, pendent jurisdiction relates to annexing state law claims
to federal question jurisdiction.' 26 It only applies in federal
court.' 27 Of course, it could apply even if the federal jurisdiction
was not exclusively federal. 128 However, the Congressional com-
ment indicates that the federal courts were charged to process
these citizen actions to abate "imminent and substantial endan-
germents."' 29 It did not want the addition of state law claims to
"frustrate or delay the primary goal of this provision, namely, the
prompt abatement of imminent and substantial endanger-
ments." 130 Virtually all the environmental literature that ad-
dressed the subject relied on the decision in Middlesex County and
indicated that there was exclusive federal court jurisdiction. One
article stated, "[c]itizen suit provisions uniformly provide that
122. Middlesex County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F. Supp. 715,
719 (D.N.J. 1986).
123. Id. at 719.
124. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-198, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5612.
125. For example, the doctrine of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the
common law is based on this presumption. See 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION 75, § 58.03 (6th ed., 2000).
126. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5612.
130. Middlesex County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F. Supp. 715,
719 (D.N.J. 1986) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-198, at 53, (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5612).
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both action forcing and private enforcement actions are to be
brought in the federal district courts." 131
The history of the citizen enforcement action in federal courts
supports the conclusion of the commentators. The first major
overhaul of the environmental laws was the Clean Air Act of 1970
(CAA). 132 The CAA established the basic provision for a citizen
suit and allowed for private enforcement.133 The provision in the
CAA was virtually copied in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972 (CWA)134 and the Noise Control Act 135 adopted in
1972.
In 1974, Congress copied the provision again in the Safe
Drinking Water Act1 36 and utilized virtually the same language
and concepts.
In the context of this series of federal environmental legisla-
tion, congressional concern was that state and local enforcement
of pollution standards had been slow, at best. The United States
Supreme Court recognized the role of federalism involved in envi-
ronmental regulation in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc.137 as Congress "taking a stick to the states."138 The
assumption was that environmental reform had to be forced at the
federal level. In 1976, Congress enacted the first versions of
RCRA1 39 and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 140 The provisions
in each Act specified that citizen enforcement actions must be
brought in the federal district courts.141
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation Act (CERCLA),142 known as "Superfund."
It did not have a citizen enforcement provision since liability for
recovery of response costs belonged to both the government and
private parties. 143 However, in 1986, Congress added a citizen en-
131. B. Boyer & E. Meidineger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Prelimi-
nary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L.
REV. 833, 848 (1995).
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601-7627 (1970).
133. Id. § 7604.
134. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1995).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1995).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1995).
137. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
138. Id. at 64.
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1995).
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1995).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1995).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1995).
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forcement provision, to be brought in the federal courts, and cop-
ied the basic citizen suit provision into 42 U.S.C. § 9659., P.L. 99-
499, tit. II, sec. 206. None of these federal environmental statutes
specifically use the phrase "exclusive federal jurisdiction" in the
citizen suit provisions. However, all contemplate only federal
court litigation.
The amendments to RCRA in 1984 added a unique citizen en-
forcement action to the basic citizen suit provision. 144 It provided
for injunctive relief to abate a dangerous threat where hazardous
materials were present.145 No other federal environmental stat-
ute provides for such a citizen action. All other citizen suit provi-
sions authorize a citizen to enforce a permit or regulation, or a
mandatory duty imposed on the agency. In section 6972(a)(1),
Congress actually authorized a citizen to obtain appropriate relief
to abate an environmental problem based on the disposal of haz-
ardous substances. 146 Congress stated that the action "shall be
brought in the district court for the district in which" the endan-
germent is alleged to occur.1 47
Without any assessment of the history of citizen suit provi-
sions and the federalism background, despite the fact that the
case had been stayed by agreement for more than one year and
that Sun had never sought to have it dismissed because of the
pendency of the state court action, the district court dismissed on
the eve of trial.148 Strangely, the court equated the words "shall
be brought in the district court for the district in which the ...
alleged endangerment may occur" with a venue provision, calling
it a "specific venue provision. "149 It reasoned that since the words
could just as easily be a venue provision, it was compelled by the
Sixth Circuit decisions to hold that state court jurisdiction was not
ousted by Congress. 50 In other words, since the language was
ambiguous, it found that the presumption in favor of concurrent
state and federal court jurisdiction must stand.' 5 '
144. See Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, tit. II, § 206, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9659
(1995)).
145. Id.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (1995).
147. Id. § 6972(a) (1995).
148. See Davis 11, 953 F. Supp. 890, 896 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
149. Id. at 895.
150. Id. at 896.
151. Id.
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This rationale, found in dictum in many older cases, had reap-
peared in the 1990 decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court
followed the doctrine that there is a presumption of concurrent
state court jurisdiction since state courts are courts of general ju-
risdiction and federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 152
Congress must overcome the presumption before there is exclu-
sive federal court jurisdiction. 153 In Yellow Freight System, Inc. v.
Donnelly,15 4 and Tafflin v. Levitt,155 the Supreme Court discussed
prior decisions and found that general language that merely con-
fers jurisdiction on the federal district courts is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption.1 56 The Court followed prior rulings
that had looked for express language in the statute, clear and
compelling legislative history, or strong evidence that state court
jurisdiction would disrupt the statutory scheme. 57 It found none
of these attributes in the Title VII language, stating that the dis-
trict court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties.158
The Sixth Circuit decision in Holmes Financial Associates v.
Resolution Trust Corp.'59 saw the need for "an explicit withdrawal
of concurrent jurisdiction" before the state courts are divested of
jurisdiction to hear a federal claim. 160 The court called for an af-
firmative and express revocation of concurrent jurisdiction before
there could be a finding of exclusive jurisdiction.16 ' The district
court stated that it was bound by Holmes since the words "shall be
brought in the district court of the district in which the alleged
endangerment may occur" were ambiguous, i.e., it could mean ju-
risdiction or it could mean venue.1 62 The Supreme Court's reason-
ing in the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction and
competence was traceable to earlier statements in Howlett v.
Rose.' 63 The general rationale is that state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction and have jurisdiction unless it is specifically
152. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
153. Id.
154. 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
155. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
156. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820; Tafflin, 493 U.S. 455.
157. See generally Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820; Tafflin, 493 U.S. 455.
158. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820.
159. 33 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 565.
161. Id.
162. Davis 1I, 953 F. Supp. 890, 895-96 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
163. See 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.17 (1990) (citing Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1918)).
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excluded. 164 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, hav-
ing only such jurisdiction as conferred upon them by Congress. 165
Thus, unless Congress removed state court jurisdiction over a fed-
eral claim, it was presumptively there, based on our system of
federalism.166
F. Federal Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the district court.167 All the judges agreed that section
6972(a)(1)(B) of RCRA did not meet the Holmes test for finding
exclusive federal court jurisdiction. 168 The Court of Appeals, with
very little discussion of the statutory language, equated the "shall
be brought" language in RCRA with the "shall have" in Title VII
as discussed in Yellow Freight,1 69 and found it insufficient to over-
come the presumed jurisdiction of the state courts.1 70 The Sixth
Circuit did not spell out that the language in RCRA designated
that the action "shall be brought in the district court for the dis-
trict" it merely stated that "shall" is the same as "shall" without
discussing the contexts.1 71
In addition, the court did not discuss its prior holding that the
designation of court of jurisdiction means that the jurisdiction is
exclusive. The decision in Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technology
Industries,172 did not involve the issue of concurrent or exclusive
jurisdiction in the state and federal trial courts. It did, however,
involve the designation in the CAA of the court where review of
EPA permit decisions were to take place. 173 The Sixth Circuit
panel in Greenpeace, stated that, "[bly specifying that review of
the Administrator's permit decisions may be had in the court of
appeals,"1 74 Congress has established exclusive jurisdiction with
the courts of appeals to review permit decisions, and not concur-
rent jurisdiction with the trial courts.' 75
164. See, e.g., Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820; Taffin, 493 U.S. 455; Holmes, 33 F.3d 561.
165. See, e.g., Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820; Taffiin, 493 U.S. 455; Holmes, 33 F.3d 561.
166. See, e.g., Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820; Tafflin, 493 U.S. 455; Holmes, 33 F.3d 561.
167. The court published aper curiam opinion with J. Boggs dissenting in part. See
Davis III, 148 F.3d at 613.
168. Davis III, 148 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 1998).
169. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 612; (citing Donnelly, 494 U.S. at 823).
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. 9 F.3d 1174 (6th Cir. 1993).
173. See Greenpeace, 9 F.3d at 1174.
174. Id. at 1180.
175. Id.
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In the Davis case, one justice dissented stating that it was
unfair to apply res judicata when Sun had acquiesced in the pen-
dency of the two actions at the same time.176 The dissenting jus-
tice argued that Sun had waived the argument by agreeing to the
splitting of the cause of action. 177 Such a waiver is set forth spe-
cifically in section 26 of the Restatement of Judgments. 178 Section
26 provides that there is an exception to the general rule against
claim splitting that would extinguish the claim. It states:
(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the general
rule of [section] 24 does not apply to extinguish the claim, and
part or all of the claim subsists as a possible basis for a second
action by the plaintiff against the defendant:
(a) The parties have agreed in terms or in effect that
the plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant has
acquiesced therein .... 179
As indicated previously, the parties had agreed to stay the pro-
ceeding in the trial court. 180
The comment to the Restatement of Judgments section is in-
formative of the reasoning behind the decision: "[A] main purpose
of the general rule stated in [section] 24 is to protect the defendant
from being harassed by repetitive actions based on the same
claim. The rule is thus not applicable where the defendant con-
sents, in express words or otherwise, to the splitting of the
claim."' 8 1 The other two judges on the panel reasoned that merely
asserting the defense of resjudicata in an answer within the short
form pleading pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure was sufficient to keep Sun from acquiescing in the splitting
of the claim.182 They acknowledged that the doctrine of res judi-
cata has many nuances, but, nevertheless, left the burden with
the plaintiff to figure out what nuances may possibly apply, even
before a judgment was reached in the state court action.183
The dissent found that the general assertion of the defense
was too ambiguous in light of the numerous conferences continu-
176. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
178. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982).
179. See id. § 26(1)(a).
180. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 606.
181. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. (1982)).
182. Id. (Boggs, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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ing the stay of the federal action by agreement.184 It compared
the case to the First Circuit decision in Diversified Foods, Inc. v.
First National Bank of Boston, 8 5 where the defendant had specifi-
cally pleaded that there was an improper "split of their causes of
action, having previously filed in a different court another com-
plaint arising out of the same transaction." 186 Since the defend-
ants had made such a plain objection, there could be no
acquiescence.18 7 The comment in the Restatement of Judgments
states, "[TIhe failure of the defendant to object to the splitting of
the plaintiffs claim is effective as an acquiescence in the splitting
of the claim."188 Sun had not raised the objection in the many con-
ferences with the trial court judge about continuing the stay, rul-
ing on motions, and scheduling a trial date. 8 9 Nevertheless, the
two circuit court judges found that pleading res judicata in the
answer was sufficient to avoid the exception to the claim-splitting
rule. 90 The majority states, "[wle conclude, moreover, that the
defense was not waived in the district court. Having stated in its
answer that '[Pilaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata,' defendant may rely on this defense and we find no error
in the district court's determination.' 91
The dissent also noted the unfairness of throwing Davis out of
court based on concurrent jurisdiction when, as the dissenting
judge stated, "no court, so far as I can tell, had ever held that
RCRA cases could be brought in state court, and that numerous
courts had either held or assumed that jurisdiction was exclu-
sively federal."1 92 In other words, Davis' good faith belief that
there was exclusive federal court jurisdiction might excuse not
bringing the RCRA claim with the state claims in state court.' 93
The two judges in the majority took a more legalistic ap-
proach and stated that the assertion of the defense was notice of
all aspects of res judicata even though there was an agreed
stay.19 4 The majority required nothing more of Sun. They placed
184. See id. at 615 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
185. 985 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1993).
186. Id. at 29.
187. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 606.
188. Id. at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 606.
190. Id. at 612.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 614.
193. See Davis IIl, 148 F.3d at 615 (citing Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1993)).
194. Id. at 612.
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no significance on the fact that Sun had not even raised its de-
fense based on concurrent state court jurisdiction and that the is-
sue was raised sua sponte by the trial court in its ruling just before
the scheduled trial.195 The appellate judges did express regret
that the trial judge did not make more of an inquiry into the issue,
but did not think the oversight was a denial of fairness or justice
for Davis.196 Davis never briefed the concurrent jurisdiction issue
in the state court.
As indicated, the Sixth Circuit gave short treatment to the
argument that RCRA does indeed provide for exclusive federal
court jurisdiction. The court did not even discuss the history of
similar citizen suit provisions or the repeated references in the
statute to the action as "in the United States District Court."1 97
In fact, the court made a comparison of the mandatory language
in Title VII discussed by the Supreme Court in Yellow Freight,
that is misleading at best, and on review, clearly wrong. 198 The
court equated the language "shall be brought in the district court
for the district" with the Title VII language that the federal courts
"shall have" jurisdiction. 199 However, it did not quote the entire
passage, but merely repeated that the word "shall" was insuffi-
cient in Yellow Freight, and, therefore, insufficient here.200 The
court did not consider the total phrase "shall be brought in the
district court for the district," apparently not seeing the signifi-
cance of a mandatory designation of a court, as opposed to merely
conferring jurisdiction on the court by stating that the courts
"shall have" jurisdiction. 201 Also, the court did not consider its
own decision, in another context, that stated that the legislative
designation of review of specific matters by the court of appeals
195. See id. at 606.
196. See id. at 612-13.
197. Section 6972 of RCRA describes the abatement of environmental endanger-
ment action several times as an action under subsection (a)(1)(B) in a court of the
United States. Section 6972(b)(1)(B) refers to the intervention of right in an (a)(1)(B)
action in a court of the United States. The same appears in section 6972(b)(1) for
actions to enforce permits. Section 6972(b)(2)(E) provides for intervention of right
specifically in an (a)(1)(B) abatement action in a court of the United States. If exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction was not intended, the language grants intervention of right in
federal court, but not in state court actions. Section 6972(b)(2)(F) requires notice be
sent to the Attorney General and the Administrator of EPA in an action brought
under (a)(1)(B) in a court of the United States. Again, under the Sixth Circuit reason-
ing, such notice is required in federal actions, but not in state court actions.
198. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 612.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
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made review of those matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the court of appeals, as opposed to the district courts. 20 2 It would
appear that the designation of the court where the action "shall be
brought" in section 6972 is quite similar to the designation of the
court of appeals in the CAA amendments. Arguably, the court
should have at least addressed the question of whether the desig-
nation intended exclusive jurisdiction.
The Sixth Circuit did not discuss the fact that this particular
citizen suit provision is unique among the environmental statutes
because it is not an action to enforce a permit, regulation or stan-
dard, but is an action to abate the actual contamination on a prop-
erty. The "imminent and substantial" language was actually
added in the 1984 amendments to RCRA.20 3 Congress was con-
cerned that this type of action not be delayed and that prompt
relief be available in the federal district court.20 4 Nevertheless,
the Sixth Circuit seemed to focus solely on its own decision in
Holmes, a decision under the Resolution Trust, where Congress
had specified that some actions were within exclusive federal
court jurisdiction and others were not, as the required interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court doctrine. 20 5 The court did not even
mention the exact language of RCRA. Arguably, it found the stan-
dard so high that no discussion was necessary. Of course, the dis-
senting judge did say that it was clear that Davis should have
been on notice that they could file in state court. 20 6 The judge
stated that the argument of concurrent jurisdiction was not that
compelling.20 7 In fact, the defendant had never made the argu-
ment at all. Nevertheless, the judge concurred with the majority
on that issue. 208
One would think that there would be some discussion of the
language used by Congress and why it referred to the action as an
"(a)(1) action in the United States district court" at several
points. 20 9 In addition, the court could have addressed the fact
that intervention was allowable in the United States district court
202. See Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Tech. Indus. 9 F.3d 1174 (6th Cir. 1993).
203. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995).
204. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt.1 at 49 (1983).
205. Holmes Financial Associates v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 561, 565 (6th
Cir. 1994).
206. Davis III, 148 F.3d at 614 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
208. See id.
209. See id. at 615 (citing Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985
F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1993)).
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action and so important that if there was concurrent jurisdiction,
there was no such intervention of right in state court. 210 The
same is true of the required notice of the action. Congress re-
quired that the Administrator of EPA and the Attorney General
have notice, presumably to decide whether to intervene in the ac-
tion "in the United States district court."211 However, if Davis had
filed in state court, such notice would not have been required
under the letter of the statute. 212 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit
did not even discuss this language or attempt to downplay its
significance.
Sun argued that section 6972(a) used the same language as
Title VII and quoted the language. 21 3 However, it was referring to
another sentence in section 6972(a) conferring remedial jurisdic-
tion on "the" district court.2 14 Sun made the incongruent argu-
ment that this language was the same as the Title VII language,
acting as if the sentence requiring that the action "shall be
brought in the district court for the district" did not exist.215 The
Sixth Circuit did not mention the argument. Nevertheless, the
court did not detract from its analysis by discussing the statutory
language that referred to the United States district courts in dif-
ferent contexts in section 6972. Since Congress did not say "exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction," then there was concurrent jurisdic-
tion.216
As indicated, the dissent's only question was whether it was
fair to Davis to bar the RCRA claim when both parties had agreed
to the stay.217 The district court had not considered fairness at
all. The majority of the three-judge panel reasoned that it was
unfortunate, and the district court could have done more, but sim-
ply pleading res judicata was sufficient despite Sun's conduct.21 8
Only the dissenting judge in the Sixth Circuit found the unfair-
ness to be substantial. 219 In the final analysis, Davis lost the lev-
erage of possible civil penalties under RCRA that would help to
persuade Sun to promptly clean up the gasoline contamination.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(E) (1995).
211. Id. § 6972(b)(F).
212. See id. § 6972(b).
213. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 612.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
215. See Davis III, 148 F.3d at 612.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 614-15 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 614 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, Davis faced the possibility of having to pay
Sun's attorney fees under section 6972.220 The district judge exer-
cised his discretion and denied Sun's request following the "good
faith" standard for plaintiffs in such cases. 221
Davis is left with contempt in the state court action where
they could possibly recover attorney fees, but would have to con-
test the matter on appeal, especially if the state court ordered the
performance bond forfeited by the failure to comply with the state
court of appeals ruling. Any leverage of daily civil penalties under
RCRA has been lost. Sun requested approval of a risk assessment
by the state agency, that, if granted, would mean the issuance of a
"no further action" letter that would require only the conversion of
an on site water well to city water. The solution for Davis is to sell
the site to a sophisticated buyer who will accept the judgment
against Sun or the prospect of approval by the state agency in the
future, without any additional cost.
As a result of reliance on existing case law, and the clear lan-
guage of the statute when he filed his RCRA action, Davis lost the
benefit of the federal statute and the "imminent and substantial
endangerment" claim. Now, any property owner facing the same
situation must be alert to the joinder of claims question and the
prohibition against splitting the cause of action when pursuing
the "quickest" remedy available.
Since the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,222
the Sixth Circuit decision stands as the highest court interpreta-
tion of this provision of RCRA. A landowner, facing a prior owner
who has contaminated the property, must join both state and fed-
eral claims if there is an imminent and substantial endangerment
issue. In making the decision of forum selection, there are consid-
erations in the decision other than where the fastest relief can be
obtained. If the case was filed in federal court and the contamina-
tion was found to be severe, but not "imminent and substantial,"
then the federal district court could dismiss the RCRA claim and
refuse to accept pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Valuable time would pass without relief. Thus, unless the state
court judge would be hostile to the plaintiff, the state court may be
220. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1995).
221. See, e.g., Painewebber Income Prop. Three Ltd. P'ship. By and Through Third
Income Prop. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 916 F. Supp. 1239 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
222. 525 U.S. 1018 (1998).
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the best avenue for relief, despite the congressional choice that the
RCRA action "shall be brought in the district court."223
Conclusion
Where a landowner finds gasoline contamination due to the
prior owner's activities, and the level of contamination is such
that it may be an endangerment to health or the environment, if
the owner has a state law claim against the prior owner, the ac-
tion may be filed in state or federal court, but must include both
the state law claims and the RCRA claim. Of course, the sixty-day
notice prerequisite of the RCRA action 224 may mean filing the
state law claim and then amending it after the notice time period
has passed, in order to add the RCRA claim. In any given case,
the "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment"
condition of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) may be easier to show
than what the state law requires. If it is a nuisance claim, it may
be "substantial and unreasonable" interference with the use of the
property. If it is fraud, it may be the strict requirements of mis-
representation of fact and reliance. If there is a contract for
remediation, the language must be construed to assess whether it
is as stringent as the RCRA standard. In Davis, the contract
called for cleanup of the contamination caused by Sun.225 That
leaves open the question of whether levels of gasoline below state
action levels would have to be met. The state trial court avoided
the issue by ordering that the cleanup satisfy the state action
levels. 226 Presumably, those state levels would be easier to meet
than "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment."
However, the issue may not have to be addressed if the action
levels are exceeded. On the other hand, the motive in Davis, to
have daily civil penalties accrue as an incentive for a prompt
cleanup, is the practical hammer that may be the best weapon to
force a prompt cleanup. In light of Davis, landowners can no
longer wait to bring a RCRA action in federal court in case the
state court action fails to rectify the contamination problem, or
where the state court order is so vague that its enforcement is nul-
lified. Concurrent jurisdiction presents the very real threat of los-
ing a claim for splitting the cause of action.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (2001).
224. Id. § 6972(b)(1)(A) (2001).
225. Davis v. Sun Refining & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio App. 1996).
226. Id.
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